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A. Introduction 
Much has been written about reservation of title clauses in the last forty years. The vast majority 
of those articles and texts concerned themselves with the technical law, and the limits of 
reservation of title clauses as seen in the litigated cases. In this field, the work of Sir Roy Goode 
and Tony Guest are perhaps useful exemplars. Both are well respected commercial law scholars, 
but with connections to practice: Goode as creator of the Centre for Commercial Law Studies at 
QMW and consultant to Mishcon & Co; Guest as a leading QC and editor of the first edition of 
relaunched Benjamin’s Sale of Goods in 1974. Outside of these doctrinal studies lies a penumbra 
of fascinating interdisciplinary works. Most notable is Sally Wheeler’s Reservation of Title Clauses: 
Impact and Implications, a socio-legal study of the extra-judicial enforcement of reservation of 
title clauses across 259 disputes prior to publication in 1991.1 
This paper seeks to establish an additional branch of inquiry. We are not concerned directly with 
the law in the courts (‘law on the page’), or with doubts about the practical enforcement of the 
rights (‘law in action’) but in the mechanism by which the change in legal culture occurred 
(‘innovation in legal culture’). Most accounts describe a period of rapid transition in the mid-
1970s, with frequent reference to Muir Hunter QC’s simile of the clauses spreading ‘like a dreadful 
weed’.2 John De Lacy contrasted the position in 1965 and 1993: 
‘As Goode and Ziegel once remarked "... in England conditional sale agreements are 
virtually unknown and such authority as there is may be regarded as turning on the facts of 
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the particular agreement under consideration"; Hire Purchase and Conditional Sale (1965), 
p.100; cf. Lipe Ltd v. Leyland Daf Ltd [1993] BCC 385, 385G-H where it is stated that in the 
context of one administrative receivership alone about 400 retention of title claims had 
been made against the company’.3 
What remains contested is the trigger point for this sudden proliferation. For many, it is the Court 
of Appeal decision in the Romalpa case in 1976,4 for others it is the (unlitigated) insolvency of 
Brentford Nylons in February 1976.5  What is undoubted is the rapid replacement of one 
contractual norm with another. Prior to the mid-1970s reservation of title clauses were largely 
unused in English commercial practice. Within a few years, the landscape had changed 
fundamentally, with such clauses becoming an integral part of the boilerplate of sales agreements. 
The puzzle is why change in the market is so rapid and so pervasive. The mechanisms for the 
passing of property in sales is clearly established in ss. 17 - 19 of the Sale of Goods Acts (1893 and 
1979) as a series of defaults, largely controlled by the intentions of the parties, whether express or 
implied. As Snead noted of section 19: 
‘This section is an embodiment of the “very basic contractual principle” that parties are 
free to contract as they will, subject only to vitiating factors such as fraud or deceit’.6 
Moreover, case law recognised the efficacy of simple retention of title clauses as far back as 
McEntire in 1895.7 It was always possible for parties to use simple reservation of title clauses, but 
they did not (generally) do so in the United Kingdom even though the device was well established 
in other jurisdictions. Why then the sudden shift? 
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Our original thoughts on this question, and indeed the initial impetus for the project, came from a 
short section of Dan Ariely’s book Predictably Irrational.8 Dan Ariely talks about how Howard 
Schultz, the creator of Starbucks, managed to convince consumers to move away from the cheap 
coffee available at Dunkin’ Donuts and instead pay several times as much for Starbucks coffee. The 
problem which had to be overcome by Schultz is known to behavioural psychologists as 
‘anchoring’ – the trait of forming a first impression, say as to the value of a product, and then 
having a difficulty in moving away from that initial reference point. American consumers were 
‘anchored’ to the cheap coffee prices at places such as Dunkin’ Donuts and would use these prices 
as a reference point for other, new coffee shops. Thus, any competitor charging substantially more 
than Dunkin’ Donuts would be seen as a bad bargain and would ultimately fail. Schultz’s solution 
to this problem was to make the Starbucks experience entirely different from the Dunkin’ Donuts 
experience, by designing Starbucks to feel like a continental coffee house, with fancy names for 
coffees and high quality coffee. Hence consumers ‘would not use the prices at Dunkin’ Donuts as 
an anchor, but instead would be open to the new anchor that Starbucks was preparing for 
[them]’.9 Ariely’s example illustrates that to shake initial impressions, we need a strong shift in 
the paradigm so that we create a new vision of the ideal.  
This lead us to question how this applies in the legal sphere, and in particular how commercial 
practitioners, when initially anchored to one idea or way of doing things, move away from that 
initial reference point. What paradigm shifts provoke widespread innovation in contract and 
commercial law? Taking reservation of title clauses as our case study, we identified the leading 
case of Romalpa as creating a shift in legal perceptions of the role of passing of property – 
Romalpa was the Starbucks of the law on reservation of title clauses.   
Moving on from this starting point, we developed the theory that contractual innovation mirrors 
technological development. This builds on the application of network theory to contract design, as 
developed in particular by Kahan and Klausner,10 and on recent work by Gulati, Scott and Posner 
                                                     
8
 D. Ariely, Predictably Irrational (Harper Collins, 2
nd
 ed., 2009) p.37 – 39. 
9
 Ibid., p.39.  
10
 See for example M. Kahan and M. Klausner, ‘Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or the 
Economics of ‘Boilerplate’)’ (1997) 83 Virginia L. Rev. 713; M. Kahan and M. Klausner, ‘Path Dependence in 
Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases’ (1996) 74 Washington U.L.Q. 347 
and M. Klausner, ‘Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts’ (1995) 81 Virginia L. Rev. 757. 
4 
 
in the United States on innovation in contract design.11 We reject the simplistic model of contract 
design reliant on individual wealth maximizing actors seeking optimal atomized contractual 
positions. Rather, we identify discontinuous, abrupt shifts in the market with the displacing of an 
existing standard (to which undue deference was given until its dominance is undermined) until a 
‘tipping point’ is reached. This theory of the evolution of contracts is a good ‘fit’ with the adoption 
of reservation of title clauses in contracts post-Romalpa and explains the shift to the new contract 
norm. 
B. The Formal Law of Retention of Title Clauses: A Brief Summary 
A retention of title clause, or reservation of title clause, is a clause in a contract for sale that says 
that the seller retains title to the goods until the buyer has paid for them. The major advantage of 
a retention of title clause is that gives the seller priority in the event of the insolvency of the buyer. 
The title in the goods never passes to the buyer, and so they do not form part of the buyer’s assets 
for the purposes of the insolvency proceedings. Thus the clause effectively places the seller of 
goods, who would otherwise most likely be an unsecured creditor, at the head of the scheme of 
distribution in insolvency, ahead of even the holders of fixed charges: 
‘The broad purpose of an agreement that a seller retains title to goods pending payment of 
the purchase price and other moneys owing to him is to protect the seller from the 
insolvency of the buyer in circumstances where the price and other moneys remain unpaid. 
The seller's aim in insisting on a retention of title clause is to prevent the goods and the 
proceeds of sale of the goods from becoming part of the assets of an insolvent buyer, 
available to satisfy the claims of the general body of creditors.’12 
Unsurprisingly, liquidators and other creditors will often object to retention of title clauses, as they 
take away from the resources of the insolvent company and reduce the amount that is left for 
other creditors. Liquidators argue that the clause is essentially a charge, which, as is it 
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unregistered, is void against a liquidator or creditor.13 This argument has succeeded in some 
instances and not in others.   
Reservation of title clauses are sometimes called ‘Romalpa’ clauses, after the leading case of 
Aluminium Industrie Vaassen BV v. Romalpa Aluminium Ltd..14 Romalpa was the first modern 
decision on reservation of title, and lead to a dramatic increase in the use of reservation of title 
clauses. However the clause relied upon in that case was one of the more complex types of 
reservation of title clause; there are other types of clause which are more straightforward and 
which require brief explanation before discussing the exact basis of the decision in Romalpa.  
The most basic type of retention of title clause, often referred to as a ‘simple’ retention of title 
clause, reflects the basic principle found in section 19(1) of the Sale of Goods Act that the seller of 
goods may reserve the right of disposal of the goods until certain conditions are fulfilled.15 Hence 
the seller seeks to retain title to the goods supplied under the contract until their price is paid. This 
clause reserves title to the goods in their original form and will generally be effective once the 
goods can be identified as the goods supplied under the contract.16 If the goods have undergone 
a process of manufacturing or are no longer in their original form they may be irrecoverable.17 
There are mixed views as to whether it is possible to draft a retention of title clause such that it 
provides for retention of title over goods which have had work done to them by the buyer. In 
Borden Lord Bridge suggested that if the seller wishes to acquire rights over the manufactured 
product, he could do so by express contractual stipulation,18 whereas in Clough Mill Goff LJ 
stated:  
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‘I find it impossible to believe that it was the intention of the parties that the seller would 
thereby gain the windfall of the full value of the new product, deriving as it may well do not 
merely from the labour of the buyer but also from materials that were his, without any 
duty to account to him for any surplus of the proceeds of sale above the outstanding 
balance of the price due by him to the seller.’19  
Of course this leaves open the possibility that the parties could draft a suitable clause which 
provides that the seller has a duty to account for any surplus of proceeds; however although this 
does not seem to have been litigated in the UK, in an Irish case an attempt to claim ‘joint 
ownership’ of manufactured goods was held to be insufficient to retain the seller’s title, and was 
instead declared a charge, which was void as it was unregistered.20 
A more complex type of clause is an ‘all sums due’ or ‘current account’ clause. This clause provides 
that the goods supplied remain the property of the seller until all sums due to the seller (not just 
the payment for the goods in question) are paid. For many years there was considerable doubt 
over whether this type of clause would be effective, as it could mean that for as long as the buyer 
had any debt outstanding the property in the goods would remain with the buyer. However, in 
Armour v Thysson21 the House of Lords upheld such a clause, basing its judgment on the parties’ 
intentions as expressed in the contract.22 
In the Romalpa case the plaintiffs, a Dutch company, had sold aluminium foil to the defendants, an 
English company, subject to a complex reservation of title clause.23 This clause provided inter alia 
that if the buyer were to manufacture the aluminium supplied, or mix it with other materials, then 
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the seller would be the owner of the new manufactured goods. The buyer was to keep these 
goods for the seller “in his capacity as fiduciary owner” and was to store them in such a way that 
they could be recognised as such. Finally, the buyer was entitled to sell these goods on to a third 
party within the normal course of business, but if the goods were not paid for was to hand over to 
the seller any claims he had against this sub-buyer.  
The defendant buyers became insolvent before paying for the aluminium foil, and this clause was 
sufficient to allow the sellers to claim a quantity of unsold foil held by the receiver. However, a 
difficulty arose in relation to a quantity of aluminium foil which had been sold on to a third party 
before the seller had been paid. The sub-buyer would have obtained good title to the goods under 
s.25(2) of the Sale of Goods Act, thus extinguishing the seller’s rights over the goods. The seller 
could not therefore claim the goods themselves, but instead claimed an interest in the proceeds of 
the resale, basing their claim on a right to trace the proceeds of sale.24 The Court of Appeal 
upheld this claim, holding that when the buyer lawfully sold on the aluminium, he had a duty to 
account for those goods in accordance with the normal fiduciary relationship of principal / agent 
or bailor / bailee. Roskill LJ stated: 
“I see no difficulty in the contractual concept that, as between the defendants and their 
sub-purchasers, the defendants sold as principals, but that, as between themselves and the 
plaintiffs, those goods which they were selling as principals within their implied authority 
from the plaintiffs were the plaintiffs' goods which they were selling as agents for the 
plaintiffs to whom they remained fully accountable. If an agent lawfully sells his principal's 
goods, he stands in a fiduciary relationship to his principal and remains accountable to his 
principal for those goods and their proceeds. A bailee is in a like position in relation to his 
bailor's goods.”25   
Thus, the first modern case on retention of title clauses established not merely that these clauses 
were effective in their simplest form, but that even when goods were sold to a third party, a far 
reaching claim to the proceeds of this re-sale could also be effective. Subsequent cases may have 
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shed doubt on whether such claims would always be effective, 26  but Romalpa certainly 
introduced the potential of reservation of title clauses with a big bang.  
C. The Impact of the Romalpa decision 
Although it is difficult to assess the impact of the Romalpa decision some 37 years after the fact, 
and nigh on impossible to determine the number of sales contracts containing retention of title 
provisions, 27 there is evidence of a surge in both the use and complexity of retention of title 
clauses post-Romalpa, in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. This is not to say that conditional sales 
were unknown before Romalpa,28 but rather that their potential as a means of additional security 
for the seller was still underestimated.   
Leading commercial law textbooks in the years leading up to Romalpa include brief discussions on 
conditional sales.29 These very general discussions recognise that imposing a condition to be 
fulfilled before the property will pass will be effective to prevent the property from passing, with 
for example Tony Guest in the 1974 edition of Benjamin’s Sale of Goods commenting that ‘the 
condition most frequently encountered in such a reservation is the payment or tender by the 
buyer of the price’.30 This text then moves on to a discussion of the passing of property when the 
seller takes a bill of lading making the goods deliverable to his own order, with instructions that 
property is not to pass to the buyer except on payment.31 The underlying presumption in the text 
is that although reservation of title until payment is made is a legal possibility, it only has any real 
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commercial implications in the context of carriage of goods by sea.32 Indeed, the 1975 edition of 
Atiyah’s Sale of Goods explicitly states that ‘by far the most important illustration of the 
reservation of the right of disposal’ is concerned with the carriage of goods by sea.33 No reference 
is made to the late 19th century House of Lords’ decision in McEntire v Crossley,34 even though 
this is arguably the leading case on reservation of title prior to Romalpa, and even though this case 
not only indicates the potential use of reservation of title in sales contracts—albeit an instalment 
sales contract which closely resembled a hire purchase agreement—but also discusses the 
possible threat such clauses pose to statutory insolvency regimes. There is no fact no discussion in 
the 1974 edition of Benjamin’s Sale of Goods of the benefits of including a reservation of title 
clause, i.e. no mention of the priority it would afford a seller in the event of the buyer’s insolvency. 
A reader with no knowledge of reservation of title would be left somewhat underwhelmed as to 
its potential use as a means of security; although paradoxically the same reader would also be 
unaware of the possible limitations of reservation of title clauses, or of the issues they raise with 
regard to the existing insolvency regime. Reservation of title simply appears to be a non-issue, or 
at the very most a peripheral feature of a sales contract.35  
Although early editions of Benjamin’s Sale of Goods focused on reservation of title in the context 
of the carriage of goods by sea, Roy Goode acknowledged their use pre-Romalpa in a different 
context. In the aftermath of Romalpa¸ he commented that although reservation of title was 
‘known to English law for a very long time’, that such clauses had ‘been mainly confined to 
instalment sale and hire purchase agreements’.36  This is in fact more of an allowance for the 
existence of retention of title clauses than he had been prepared to make in 1965, when he stated 
that ‘in England conditional sale agreements are virtually unknown and such authority as there is 
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may be regarded as turning on the facts of the particular agreement under consideration’.37  
Moreover, any reservation of title clauses tended to be simple rather than complex: ‘English 
lawyers have tended to concentrate on the efficacy of the title retention or security against third 
parties in relation to the original asset rather than in relation to proceeds.’38  
This lack of innovation regarding reservation of title can be contrasted with the position 
elsewhere, in particular in Germany39 and the Netherlands where the use of retention of title 
clauses and claims to proceeds was routine.40 It is no surprise that the Romalpa case itself 
concerned a clause inserted by a Dutch supplier,41 and that the Brentford Nylons scandal 
(discussed below) similarly concerned the supply of goods by an overseas supplier.42 Moreover, 
there appears to have been an awareness in the UK of the fact that such clauses were used across 
Europe.43   
Although we do not currently have access to sales contracts from the years immediately after 
Romalpa, contemporaneous accounts of the change in legal culture exist. Roy Goode was 
particularly vocal on the impact of the decision.44 In an article in The Times in May 1977 he 
famously stated that ‘it is doubtful whether any case decided this century has created a greater 
impact on the commercial world than Romalpa.’45 In terms of the practical impact Romalpa had 
on commercial practice, he stated: ‘In the wake of Romalpa, suppliers all over the country began 
to include reservation of title clauses in their contracts, stamp ‘Romalpa’ on their invoices and 
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assert proprietary claims to the goods on the buyer’s bankruptcy’.46 Romalpa clauses were said to 
‘have now become so common in this country as to present a serious threat to the smooth 
running of business’.47 Other contemporaneous literature backs up this contention that in the 
aftermath of Romalpa there was an increased use of retention of title clauses.48 
Furthermore, Goode commented that not only have such clauses become more common, but 
‘encouraged by Romalpa, sellers have developed more extended clauses which are sometimes 
extremely elaborate’.49 Thus sellers started to develop clauses which claimed not only title to the 
original goods but also any products and proceeds of sale and ‘current account’ clauses. 
Such empirical evidence that exists, while limited, appears to back up Goode’s claims of a rise in 
both the use and complexity of reservation of title clauses. In a small scale study of 35 businesses, 
conducted by Julie Spencer in the late 1980’s, 59% of respondents said that they included 
reservation of title clauses in their contracts.50 This study further demonstrated that businesses 
using these clauses did not just use simple retention of title clauses, but also proceeds of sale 
clauses, current account clauses and clauses claiming manufactured goods.51 When asked when 
they had first included a reservation of title clause in their conditions of sale, answers ranged from 
1976, the year Romalpa was decided, to 1986, with 71% of those who used reservation of title 
clauses indicating that they had only included the clause since 1980. Spencer opines that the 
greater influence of Romalpa from 1980 might be due to the ‘substantial increase in the annual 
number of insolvencies since 1980’.52  However, court decisions continued to have an influence, 
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with a new surge of businesses using a clause, or adapting an existing clause, after the decision in 
Clough Mill Ltd in 1984.53  
This is not the first time it has been suggested that prevailing economic conditions accelerated the 
process by which suppliers adopted reservation of title clauses. For example, De Lacy stated that 
with the economic downturn it was ‘hardly surprising that parties began to re-evaluate their 
contractual relations and the expectations contained therein’,54 and writing in 1978 Kerr stated 
that while concept of reservation of title ‘is old and well-known’ it had been ‘brought to the fore 
by economic instability.’55  
A further factor which contributed to the impact of the legal decision in Romalpa was the media 
attention afforded to the Brentford Nylons ‘debacle’56 around the same time as the Romalpa 
decision. Brentford Nylons was a large textile manufacturer which specialised in the manufacture 
of cheap nylon shirts and light household furnishings such as sheets and curtains. The company 
originally sold its goods by mail order, but moved to a new business model whereby it sold from 
stores. The difficulty with this was that it was ‘difficult if not impossible for any one manufacturer 
to provide a sufficient range of own-brand goods to attract custom in sufficient volume’.57 In 
addition, the industry was moving from nylon manufacture to other types of materials, and the 
company incurred significant debt constructing a large new factory in Northumberland to facilitate 
a move to polyester cotton. All these factors were thought to put a strain on resources, and in 
February 1976 the company called in a receiver.58 However, two of Brentford’s major creditors, a 
German fibre manufacturer and its main UK supplier, both of whom were associated with a large 
Dutch fibres company, almost immediately threatened the receiver with an injunction to stop the 
sale of £5 million worth of raw materials supplied to Brentford Nylons but which had not been 
paid for.59 They claimed that the stock had been sold subject to a reservation of title clause and 
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thus still belonged to them. The dispute was settled through private negotiations rather than 
taken through the courts, supposedly because of the number of jobs that would have been lost if 
production was forced to cease due to an inability to use the raw materials.60 The Brentford 
Nylons story did not however end there, as the Government subsequently offered Lonrho, an 
international trading group with large textile interests, a loan of £5 million to purchase Brentford 
Nylons and save jobs.61 This was despite the fact that the Department of Trade had recently 
conducted a controversial investigation into Lonrho’s activities in Africa and parts of its report had 
been forwarded on to the police.62  This case appears to have provoked reactions from several 
quarters, with, for example, the Institute of Chartered Accountants commencing an enquiry to 
assess the implications of this type of clause and to see how widespread its use was.63 Thus the 
Brentford Nylons scandal represented the ‘law in action’ illustration of the effect of reservation of 
title clauses, and would have added to the public consciousness of the impact of insolvency. This 
scandal, combined with the economic conditions of the time, no doubt added to the impact of 
Romalpa.  
It is sometimes argued that the impact of the Romalpa decision has been overstated, based solely 
on the fact that in subsequent cases where suppliers have attempted to rely on clauses drafted 
based on Romalpa, the courts have distinguished Romalpa on rather shaky grounds and refused to 
follow it.64 Thus, for example, De Lacy has stated in relation to Goode’s statements regarding the 
significance of Romalpa: 
‘At the time the case was decided such a statement would undoubtedly have been an 
accurate reflection of popular commercial sentiment. However, from today's perspective it 
appears to be an embarrassing largesse, more reflective of a “pious hope"65 than a 
judgment upon the beginning of a commercial revolution. It will be seen that far from 
                                                     
60
 ‘Fibre makers in pact with Brentford Nylons Receiver’ The Times March 6, 1976. 
61
 ‘Government offers Lonrho £5m loan to save 1,600 jobs at two Brentford Nylons factories’ The Times June 25, 
1976. Employees of the company had also sought State aid in a bid to take over the company: see ‘Outlook for 
Brentford Nylons aid’ The Times June 22, 1976.  
62
 ‘Government offers Lonrho £5m loan to save 1,600 jobs at two Brentford Nylons factories’ The Times June 25, 
1976. Lonrho, and in particular its head Tiny Rowland, was later cleared of any charges but the company and its 
leaders remained controversial: ‘Tiny Rowland, African Giant’ BBC News, July 26 1998. Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/139596.stm  
63
 ‘Fibre makers in pact with Brentford Nylons Receiver’ The Times March 6, 1976. It is unclear whether this enquiry 
commenced before or after the Brentford Nylons scandal.  
64
 See for example Re Andrabell Ltd. [1984] 3 All ER 407 and Compaq Computers Ltd. v Abercorn Group Ltd. [1991] 
BCC 484. 
65
 Citing Bridge LJ in Borden (UK) Ltd v Scottish Timber Products Ltd [1981] Ch. 25, 39. 
14 
 
having a great impact upon commercial law the case has fallen by the wayside and has all 
but been overruled by the courts of first instance.’66  
However, the point being made in this article—and possibly by Goode at the time of writing—is 
that the case had reverberations for commercial practice and contractual innovation, regardless of 
whether subsequent court decisions then diminished the effectiveness of proceeds of sales 
clauses.67 
The impact of Romalpa is also sometimes rejected on the basis that in practice such clauses are 
rarely litigated or enforced. It is true that actual legal decisions on reservation clauses are few and 
far between, but the limited empirical evidence that does exist shows that given the correct 
circumstances and proper drafting, reservation of title clauses, particularly ‘simple’ reservation of 
title clauses,68 are enforced and have effect.69 The difficulty with enforcement appears to occur 
mostly when a clause is poorly drafted,70 where there is a lack of evidence that the goods claimed 
were in fact the subject of a contractual provision for retention of title,71 and where the supplier 
of goods does not move fast enough to put a receiver on notice of his retention of title claim.72 
Worthington has made the point that retention of title devices fail where ‘the substance of the 
parties’ agreement triumphs over the form used to define property ownership’.73 Wheeler in 
contrast has focused on the importance of the negotiating powers of the parties involved in 
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determining whether or not the clause is enforced.74 Moreover the lack of enforcement of clauses 
says nothing about their existence, or about the number of claims made in relation to them.75 
However, the focus of this paper is not so much on the issue of whether or not these clauses are 
enforced but rather on the impact the Romalpa decision had on commercial practice and 
innovation, in the sense that there was a sudden, noticeable increase in the number of contracts 
including complex reservation of title clauses after the decision. Whether or not these clauses are 
ultimately enforced is essentially irrelevant to this issue. 
Thus, within 10 years, there appears to be a new, stable position of using a reservation of title 
clause in the majority of such contracts, and a supply of goods on credit terms. The insolvency risk 
is now shared in a more complex fashion. If the reservation of title clause is effective, then the 
supplier will recover the goods, although this may well provide less than full recovery of the profit 
obtainable through payment of the contract price.76 Often the supplier will have traded the ‘book 
debt’ owed by the purchaser to a second finance house, and it will now hold the risk of enforcing 
the Romalpa clause. Moreover, the supplier’s financiers will not be able to look to those apparent 
assets to meet any outstanding indebtedness to it. It is vital to these creditors that they are able to 
properly price the credit being offered, as either unsecured or secured on incoming assets. 
However, there remains a substantial risk of a reservation of title clause not being enforced in 
practice to full effect, if at all. The information costs of verifying each incoming shipment would 
prohibit dealing with credit management on an ad hoc basis. What we have therefore, is a three 
dimensional co-ordination game, played by finance houses at both ends of a sales contract. The 
additional dimension comes in the likely chain (and web) of such deals, as raw materials are 
traded, processed, branded, and presented to retail customers. 
It is thus evident that Romalpa thus had a serious impact on the commercial world, in that there 
was an increase in the number of sellers including reservation of title clauses into their contracts, 
and the clauses which were drafted were more complex and detailed. The question that this paper 
poses is why Romalpa had such an impact, when reservation of title clauses were already known 
in the commercial world. This paper relies on a theory of the evolution of contract innovation to 
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explain why these clauses were ignored or left on the periphery until the dramatic shift in practice 
brought by Romalpa.  
D. Modelling Change: The 'Innovation in Contract' Literature and Romalpa 
In order to understand the process of innovation in boilerplate, we need first to debunk some 
myths of contract negotiation. As Feinman noted, the process of agreement of supply chain 
contracts will not meet the idealised vision of neoclassical contract theory: 
‘The image that motivated [the] realm [of neoclassical contract theory] was the isolated 
bargain between independent, self-interested individuals. Steely-eyed bargainers carefully 
calculated their interests in a particular exchange, gave a promise or performance only in 
return for something else, and embodied their transaction in an agreement that carefully 
defined the terms of performance and therefore could provide the basis for a determinate 
remedy in case of breach'.77 
The work of Marc Galanter suggested instead that the legal system favours repeat players (who 
act strategically over the long-term) over ‘one shotters’ for whom the litigation represents their 
sole experience of the issue.78 The long term perspective of the repeat player will include 
litigation strategies to develop the law to best suit their long term goals. Outcomes, in litigation 
and negotiation,79 will depend on expertise and resources, rather than the ‘law on the page’ or in 
the contract. Within sales contracts, the contracting parties may be expert repeat players in some 
areas (such as duties relating to delivery, or non-legal recovery of the price) but are likely to be 
closer to ‘one shotters’ in respect of insolvency issues. The insolvency practitioner and the finance 
houses involved indirectly are much more likely to be familiar with the process of business failure, 
but are not contracting parties. In the case of the banks, they can influence the contractual 
position by imposing formal or informal controls on the flow of credit, such as differential pricing 
for credit where the goods are subject to a retention of title clause. Obviously, the insolvency 
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practitioner would not have been in a position to influence the contract as drafted, but as Wheeler 
demonstrated, has considerable practical influence on the contract as implemented.80    
How then are we to understand the process of negotiation and retention of title clauses within 
sales contracts? The first point is to note that we do not expect ‘steely eyed bargainers’ 
scrutinizing the clause for its probable effect. A more realistic description of the process is given by 
Richman, who imagined the mass production of contracts by law firms: 
‘If we understand the literature on organizational economics, and if we apply that 
literature to the large law firm, we will conclude that the creation of mass-produced goods 
that do not ideally meet consumer demands should come as no surprise. This is not the 
consequence of agency costs or a lack of attorneys' fidelity to their clients; it merely 
illustrates the limits and, indirectly, the strengths of large organizations. Indeed, observing 
that legal products do not perfectly match contemporary needs might be no less 
provocative than observing that Detroit is long overdue to produce high-mileage cars. So 
there is a moral, and a rather mundane moral at that. The moral is that law firms, legal 
products, and lawyers are all subject to the same laws of organization and innovation as 
the rest of the economy, and that lawyers should not be presumed to be all that different 
from assembly line workers’.81 
The result of this is that bespoke contract design is not a high priority within routine commercial 
arrangements. ‘Boilerplate’: the use of standard, non-negotiated terms is rife. This is not restricted 
to ‘mass market’ contracts, either: 
‘… standard terms would appear to be no less widespread in contracts among the 
sophisticated. Notwithstanding their representation by able counsel, charged to craft 
comprehensive and detailed, but also particularized, contracts, such parties will commonly 
conclude agreements comprised heavily of traditional terms--contracting norms of a sort-
rather than terms tailored to the distinct features of their particular bargain’.82 
The ‘sausage factory’ production of contracts leads to a sharp division between the perceived high 
powered litigators and less ‘legal’ drafters and negotiators. Moreover, the division was not merely 
in approach but in source material and interest in doctrine. Gulati and Scott reported: 
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‘… neither one of us had seen much evidence of transactional lawyers engaged in a 
dynamic process of regularly reading cases and incorporating that learning into novel 
innovations in subsequent contracts. Some of the transactional lawyers we knew did not 
appear to have looked at a case in years. The task of reading cases seemed to be the 
province of the litigators, while the thinking about contract drafting remained with the 
transactional lawyers. In theory, the two groups might be specializing and transferring 
information across the artificial boundary that separated them. However, we had seen 
little evidence of interaction among transactional lawyers and litigators, let alone a process 
by which they collaborated in R&D on contract design’.83 
This leads then to two simple questions: 
1. Why do contractual provisions converge? 
2. When (and why) do contracts then change? 
In order to answer these questions, we adapt the network theory as used by Eric Posner, Richard 
Scott and Mitu Gulati et al in respect of pari passu clauses in sovereign debt contracts and apply 
this theory to Romalpa. In the section below, we start with a little background on network theory 
as a basis for modelling contractual innovation. We then apply network theory to Romalpa and 
identify where and how that theory can help explain the proliferation of reservation of title 
clauses in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. We then discuss how Posner/Scott/Gulati developed 
this theory and how their version of this theory explains this phenomenon. We conclude by 
evaluating whether their version is a better ‘fit’ than the more traditional explanations of network 
theory. 
[1]. Network Theory and Contract Innovation 
 
Once limited to the explanation of the adoption of technological innovations, in more recent years 
network theory has been used to explain the spread of legal innovation, and to predict the success 
or failure of new legal regimes such as the Common European Sales Law.84 In this section we 
provide a brief overview of network theory, as ‘traditionally’ applied to contractual innovation, 
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and examine whether this account of network theory can provide an explanation for the increased 
use of reservation of title clauses post-Romalpa.  
The principal feature of networks is that ‘the utility that a given user derives from [a network 
product] depends upon the number of other users who are in the same “network”’.85  Hence, the 
value of the network increases as the number of users increases. The classic example of this is the 
use of telephones – if only one person ever owned a telephone, then it would be a useless 
innovation; the value of a telephone is dependent on other people also owning telephones.86 The 
benefit of increased usage to all users on the network is referred to as a ‘positive network 
externality’ or a ‘network effect’, and network effects may be direct and indirect.87  
The difficulty with networks is that positive network effects can result in ‘excess inertia’ – a 
‘socially excessive reluctance to switch to a superior new standard when important network 
externalities are present in the current one’.88 Users may be reluctant to switch to a new product 
which has relatively few users in the early stages, and thus few network benefits, instead 
preferring to stick to an existing product which has network benefits, even if the existing product 
is in other ways inferior to the new product.  This phenomenon, described as ‘standardization-by-
sheer-force-of-numbers’,89 has been used to explain the dominance of, for example, the QWERTY 
typewriter, despite the fact that alternative forms of keyboard exist.90 
This network analysis can be applied not only to different types of technology, but also to legal 
culture and practices,91 and, importantly for our purposes, to contracts92 and contract terms. In 
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the 1990s Kahan and Klausner took the lead in this particular field of analysis, arguing that the 
widespread use of contract terms by many firms confers network benefits on the users.93 These 
network benefits include the availability of high levels of expertise as lawyers and accountants 
gain experience with the term, and also the availability of judicial interpretations of the term, 
which reduces uncertainty as to how the term is to be applied. In contrast, there will be little 
expertise and potentially much to lose94 from a ‘new’ or innovative term which is not used by 
many firms.  Hence a commonly used but clumsy contract term with network benefits will often 
trump a ‘better’ contract term lacking these network benefits.95  
Where network theory is of assistance to us in our efforts to understand the move towards the 
incorporation of retention of title clauses, is in relation to its explanation of why users sometimes 
do move to a new standard, even in the face of an existing network or norm.96 Certain factors 
greatly increase the chance of migration to a new standard, and when taken together can explain 
the shift to the increased use and complexity of retention of title clauses.  
First, predictions as to the success of a new network result in ‘positive feedback’; hence a strong 
focus on the popularity of a new network product will, in itself, increase the popularity of the 
product: 
‘If consumers expect your product to become popular, a bandwagon will form, the virtuous 
cycle will begin, and consumers’ expectations will prove correct. But if consumers expect 
your product to flop, your product will lack momentum, the vicious cycle will take over, 
and again consumers’ expectations will prove correct. The beautiful if frightening 
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implication: success and failure are driven as much by consumer expectations and luck as 
by the underlying value of the product.’97 
Positive expectations can thus ‘tip’ the market in favour of a new network.  
The importance of expectations management means that the existence of a network ‘sponsor’ 
who can strategise and promote a new product can be crucial in the adoption of a new network.98 
This sponsor is often the owner of the new technology, and frequently has proprietary rights (such 
as intellectual property rights) over the new technology. Although retention of title clauses clearly 
had no ‘owner’ and no clear ‘sponsor’, owing in part to the accidental nature of their creation,99 
this does not mean that they was not promoted. In particular, expert academic practitioners 
played a vital role as communicators of the message that the Romalpa decision was not one to be 
ignored, and made crucial predictions as to the likelihood that suppliers would increasingly use 
these clauses. Thus for example, Prior stated:  
‘Vendors of goods and materials can be expected to incorporate, into their standard 
conditions, Romalpa type provisions and company secretaries will certainly be looking to 
their lawyers to achieve this.’ 100 
Similarly, comments to the effect that there has been a ‘sudden upsurge in interest’ in reservation 
of title clauses,101 or that they are in ‘widespread use’102 not only represent a comment on the 
existing commercial practice, but greatly affect the future state of things, and can, in and of 
themselves, increase the use of retention of title clauses. Nor were these comments limited to 
academic journals – Goode’s article in The Times in 1977, in which he stated that Romalpa clauses 
‘have now become so common in this country as to present a serious threat to the smooth 
running of business’103, could feasibly have increased the use of the clause by suppliers. Similarly, 
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the initiation of investigations into reservation of title clauses by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants could simply have added to the idea that they were becoming increasingly popular.104 
This is arguably backed up by the fact that although these comments about the purported 
popularity of retention of title clauses were all made in the 1970s, the empirical evidence by 
Spencer shows that many businesses did not start incorporating retention of title clauses until a 
few years later.105 Using Malcolm Glidewell’s analysis of the spread of ideas, discussed below, 
these academic commentators who spread the word about this new innovation can be viewed as 
the ‘Mavens’ of commercial law. 
Coordination is another key feature of the transition to a new network. Farrell and Saloner have 
shown that only firms that strongly favour a switch to a new network will join early, whereas if 
firms only moderately favour a change they may be ‘insufficiently motivated to start the 
bandwagon rolling, but would get on it if it did start to roll’.106 This is referred to as ‘symmetric 
inertia’, where all firms prefer the new technology yet do not make the change. This problem is 
often exacerbated by a lack of information – it is difficult to know whether other firms are thinking 
of changing; hence nobody changes. New networks are thus more likely to succeed where the 
move to the new network is coordinated or where a ‘big player’ makes the first move or 
encourages others to do so. Thus Kahan and Klausner have commented on how underwriters have 
significantly influenced firms’ contracting choices, and how these intermediaries have the ability 
to affect a high volume of contracts.107 In the case of retention of title clauses it is not 
immediately clear where this coordination came from, as law firms are not as a rule coordinated. 
Here, the role of expert, market leaders such as Roy Goode may have been crucial. We explore this 
in more depth below. 
Finally, sponsors who wish to ensure that a new network succeeds may choose to ensure 
compatibility of the new system with the existing network, taking what is described as an 
‘evolutionary’ strategy by Shapiro and Varian.108 Compatibility with the old system facilitates 
migration to the new system, as it is not necessary to entirely overhaul or abandon the old system. 
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Similarly, retention of title clauses were essentially compatible with the existing contracts -- no 
major changes to the structure of the contract were necessary, at least in the immediate 
aftermath of Romalpa.109  This would have facilitated the change to include such clauses. 
However, the difficulty with this aspect of network theory is that although it certainly contributes 
to the explanation of why ROT clauses were adopted, it does little to explain why the change 
happened at that particular point in time, and not previously.  
A second, alternative explanation for the uptake of new networks provides a possible answer to 
this question. This is the idea that a new network may be adopted, even where it is not compatible 
with existing networks, if it offers a ‘revolutionary’ change; if the new product is ‘so much better 
than what people are using that enough users will bear the pain of switching to it’.110 The 
Romalpa case provided this revolutionary change; offering innovative benefits which did not exist 
before hand. Retention of title clauses were no longer useful only where goods were unchanged 
and unsold before the buyer became insolvent; now they had potential to protect a supplier even 
when the buyer had manufactured goods from the products and sold the goods on.  
Moreover, the Romalpa judgment immediately provided this new innovation with one of the 
major network benefits associated with well-known existing contract terms, namely the existence 
of a judicial interpretation of the term. An English firm did not have to ‘pioneer’ the term and take 
the risk that it would not be of effect in an English court; instead a foreign supplier, assuming that 
Dutch law would apply, inserted it into their contract and inadvertently took the risk of receiving 
an unfavourable judgment on behalf of English suppliers. A further network benefit, the 
availability of some knowledge as to how these clauses would work in practice in the event of 
insolvency, was provided both by the Romalpa case and by the Brentford Nylons insolvency. The 
latter was widely reported in the press and would have demonstrated to UK suppliers that 
retention of title clauses can produce results for suppliers.111 
Network theory can thus tell us that Romalpa represented a revolutionary innovation (perhaps 
one similar to Dan Ariely’s ‘paradigm shift’) which although lacking an official ‘owner’ was 
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promoted by a significant number of academics, all of whom predicted its ultimate success to the 
point that that success became an inevitability. Choi, Gulati and Posner have recently drawn on 
network theory to put forward a new theory of contract evolution, and it is this development to 
which we now turn.    
[2]. Innovation, Technologies and Market Paradigm Shift: Fitting Network 
Theory to Boilerplate 
Over the last 6 years, a research group based on the East coast of the United States has been 
pondering the impact of negotiating processes on contractual boilerplate. Led chiefly by Robert 
Scott and Mitu Gulati, this project has sought empirical and interview based evidence on the 
negotiation and agreed form of sovereign debt contracts, with focus on those administered in 
New York and London. The sum total of these agreements would run into many billions, and might 
be thought to represent the pinnacle of high end contracting. Each party (whether State or 
underwriter) will have access to substantial expert advice, both legal and fiscal. The contracts are 
relatively simple, and have not evolved markedly over several hundred years. Despite this, most of 
these contracts contain a clause (the ‘pari passu’ clause) that is generally recognised as having no 
clear agreed meaning, no obvious contractual benefit, and yet carries a marked litigation risk. The 
clause was apparently borrowed from corporate lending agreements and stipulates that this 
creditor shall be treated as of equal rank to all other creditors in liquidation. In the corporate 
environment, this would have potential benefits to the creditor. With sovereign debt, there is no 
liquidation, only default, and so the clause loses its value to the creditor. It is possible that it had 
some beneficial usage when such clauses were first included in sovereign debt bonds (possibly as 
early as 1870),112 although none of the practitioners interviewed for that project seemed to have 
a clear idea of what that might have been. It is obvious that in a modern sovereign debt contract 
such a statement has no obvious prima facie advantage to the parties, and recent litigation 
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showed some potential for litigation.113 After one research lunch, Scott and Gulati admitted 
defeat in their search for an easy answer: 
‘Several hours later, long after the others had left the lunch table, the two of us realized 
that we could not suggest a plausible answer to why the clause had neither been improved 
nor, better yet, just deleted. The failure to revise a contract term that, owing to an 
aberrant interpretation, now carried a nontrivial litigation risk was inconsistent both with 
the theoretical models of how sophisticated contract drafters behaved and with the 
dynamic model of case law serving as the basis for contract drafting and innovation’.114 
This lead to a substantial empirical project, which drew on a detailed archive of contractual 
documents collated over several hundred years, and interviews with key market participants 
(mostly lawyers). Their findings have been published in at least two significant articles and a stand 
alone text.115  
In seeking to understand the process of contractual boilerplate (as stagnation), and the limits of 
change in contractual terms, Gulati & Scott sought to measure at least 10 possible explanations.116 
Some of these were based on rational assumptions of behaviour and others on non-rational 
heuristics. For the purposes of this paper we focus on one substantial component in the mix: the 
benefit measurable by network theory. This theory is developed in a 2013 paper published in the 
New York University Review, in which Choi, Gulati and Posner demonstrated that contract 
evolution goes through three stages: 
‘stage one when a particular standard form dominates in the absence of external shocks; 
stage two when there are external shocks and marginal players experimenting with 
deviations from the standard form; and stage three when a new standard emerges.’117 
 
This analysis fits in with the above explanation of the explosion of retention of title clauses in the 
sense that both rely on an external trigger – a ‘revolutionary’ strategy in the case of networks, an 
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‘external shock’ or ‘tipping point’ in the case of Choi et al’s theory. In fact, the reference to a 
‘tipping point’ is one which is often found in the network theory literature. This brings us full circle 
to the explanation of why reservation of title clauses took off in the late 1970s and 1980s – the 
Romalpa case, complete with poor economic conditions and the media attention given to the 
Brentford Nylons scandal, caused an external shock which had a ripple effect through the 
commercial and legal community.  
A further development found in Choi et al’s explanation of contractual innovation is that contract 
innovations are said to arise ‘not only from high-volume intermediaries but also from marginal 
players’.118 These marginal players are more likely to be involved in the early stages of innovation 
but their actions may not be noticed; it is only when bigger players such as dominant law firms, or 
in the case of Choi et al’s study, industry groups or the IMF, begin to ‘play a key role in 
promulgating the innovation’ that the new standard will accelerate. However, even marginal 
players are said to need an external shock, or some external factor, before they begin to 
experiment.   
In the next section we examine this theory in more detail and apply it to Romalpa.  
[3]. Applying Scott and Gulati to Romalpa 
The Scott and Gulati project has spawned two distinct lines of data: the interviews with key 
participants and the dataset of contract forms. In this piece we draw largely from their work on 
the second source of data, and consider the way in which established norms are broken and 
replaced with fresh ‘standard’ terms. As stated above, they adapt network theory for the 
modelling of technological change. This suggests a three phase process. First, the established 
norm is subject to some external shock that undermines its dominance. In phase 2, the gap is filled 
by innovation from fast moving smaller businesses. Finally, in phase 3, a new equilibrium is 
established when large scale users adopt a new standard. In this section we propose that this 
model explains the rise and spread of the Romalpa clause. 
 
Phase 1: Boilerplate and Convergence of Contract Terms 
Prior to 1974 there appears to be a settled tradition in favour of not reserving title in sales 
contracts. Rather, purchasers sought credit from their financiers and used those monies to obtain 
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goods on cash terms. This provided immediate payment to the supplier, and the purchaser’s 
financiers took the risk that the materials supplied would not be processed profitably due to 
insolvency. The financiers involved commonly took a ‘floating charge’ on the book assets of the 
company to obtain preference over unsecured creditors in insolvency.119 
 
Phase 2: External Shocks and the first Transition Phase 
The understood positions of the parties in this game are disrupted by the combined shocks of 
economic decline, and the evidence of this in the Brentford Nylons and Romalpa insolvencies. The 
shock comes from the unpaid seller having an effective claim (at least on these facts) to the 
unprocessed materials and the proceeds of sale of processed materials. In the familiar game of 
musical chairs that is business failure, the debenture holders found they had no seat when the 
music ended. This fundamentally changed the rules of the game. 
The insolvencies in Brentford Nylons and Romalpa were not isolated incidents at a time of 
economic decline. Their significance derives from their ‘other-wordly’ nature. The established 
order of priority in insolvency was disrupted by the reservation of title clauses. These are alien for 
at least two reasons. First, in both cases they were incorporated as a result of cross-border trade, 
and the adoption of non-British norms as to the passing of property. In Romalpa and Brentford 
Nylons the suppliers are Dutch. We do not currently have access to the Brentford Nylons supply 
contracts, but the Romalpa clause was not designed to bring about a change in English Law. It was 
Dutch in origin, and expected to be enforced under Dutch law. This is then change by mutation 
rather than deliberate innovation. This is not unusual. Many technologies that have led to 
dramatic market shifts have been inadvertent: Viagra, stainless steel and Saccharin are all 
reputedly ‘happy accidents’.120 
The more legal cause of their ‘otherness’ is the source of the broader effects in Romalpa: the 
equitable origin of the tracing remedy used by the unpaid seller to go beyond the goods supplied 
and makes claims over the proceeds of sale. This usage of equitable principles in commercial law 
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was thought sufficiently significant to deserve a double length article by Roy Goode in the Law 
Quarterly Review.121 
Following a shock to the system of this magnitude, Choi, Gulati and Posner predicted that the 
initial reaction will be limited within large, established enterprises which will adhere to the prior 
standard. They assert that the immediate innovation will arise within smaller organisations which 
will seek market share by experimenting with innovative forms. These will not displace the 
established norm immediately. Rather, as with technologies generally, these adaptations will need 
to adopted by established market players in order to gain traction. 
This model of change is best represented graphically. In the following figure122 we see the 
distribution of sovereign debt contracts between two competing sets of boilerplate- the standard 
Ireland 1967 terms and the innovative Mexico 2003 variant: 
 
It is the ‘S-shape’ of the Mexico 2003 form that is particularly instructive. This is what network 
theory would predict for the market development of a new technology.123 The old standard (the 
Ireland 1967) was already in decline as new variants were introduced even before the Mexico 
2003 form gained prominence. This is due to an external shock, here: the 1995 Mexican debt 
crisis.124 The Mexico form is not therefore in direct competition with the Ireland 1967 form as 
such, that old standard has already lost substantial position in the market. Put simply, there is a 
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lag between the displacement of the old standard caused by an external shock and the rise of a 
new standard. That represents the period in which smaller players seek to innovate and gain 
market share. As Choi, Gulati and Posner found: 
‘The innovations in stage two all came from minor players- minor in terms of the issuers 
and in terms of their lawyers’.125 
Phase 3: The Struggle for Dominance and the Emergence of a New Standard 
That process of fierce competition then burnt itself out as a new standard was set. Again, drawing 
from their study of contract form in that market, Choi et al were able to conclude: 
‘In the wake of heated debate over [the process for handling sovereign default]… in 2002, 
the four new models- Mexico 2003, Brazil 2003, Uruguay 2003, and Turkey 2003-quickly 
began to dominate the scene. Two features of these four new models are interesting. First, 
they all showed up in 2003. This represents the point at which the dominant Ireland 1967 
model exited from the New York market. Second, the models in stage three that appeared 
in 2003 were from the high-volume issuers and their high-volume lawyers, unlike what we 
saw in stage two. These four models are, we surmise, the big players competing to be the 
authors of the new dominant design’. 
The significance of this predictor is that it appears to be a good fit for the rise of the Romalpa 
clause. We do not have the kind of empirical data used by Posner, Gulati, Scott and others in their 
wide ranging project. Nonetheless, the fit between the contemporaneous account of the spread of 
Romalpa clauses (and the many variants of such clauses) is significant. In the years after Romalpa, 
the limits of reservation of title clauses were tested in litigation. The process of challenging the 
Romalpa decision to shape it to better fit the expectations of the repeat player insolvency 
practitioner’s is consistent with Galanter’s account of law’s progression. However, the Scott / 
Gulati project explains the equivalent process for the shaping of the contractual terms in the 
market. This provides a useful tool for the analysis of boilerplate in commercial contracts, and 
ought to be employed more widely. 
What is missing from the Scott / Gulati account is an explanation of how these forms spread 
throughout the market. We believe that it can be significantly improved by the addition of a 
further element: the ‘Maven’ of Malcolm Gladwell’s book The Tipping Point. 
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[4]. Boilerplate: Mavens and Tipping Points 
The spread of knowledge throughout a community is part of the staple research diet of marketing, 
consumer behaviour, communication and political science.126 Within marketing, the concept of 
the ‘maven’ has become established. Malcolm Gladwell, in his book about the epidemiology of 
ideas The Tipping Point called such individuals ‘Mavens’, the word coming from the Yiddish for a 
trusted source of information. Within the academic literature, market mavens are defined as: 
‘individuals who have information about many kinds of products, places to shop, and other 
facets of markets, and initiate discussions with consumers and respond to requests from 
consumers for market information’.127 
 Their motivation for this is mixed, but in the commercial sphere it is likely that: 
‘individuals may transmit information as part of an implicit contract in which the 
information receiver pays for the information by providing information or other rewards to 
the giver. That is, a market maven may provide general information to individuals who, in 
turn, give information to the maven, perhaps on specific topics about which they are 
particularly knowledgeable’.128 
The crucial difference between this type and other ‘opinion leaders’ (‘individuals who acted as 
information brokers intervening between mass media sources and the opinions and choices of the 
population’)129 is the social, face-to-face dissemination of the information. 
We speculate that company secretaries became aware of the Romalpa decision through two 
distinct pathways. First, through the reports in the financial and general media attention 
surrounding the Brentford Nylons and Romalpa insolvencies. The first instance decision of 
Mocatta J was not reported (in the Law Reports) until the appeal was heard in 1976, but Roy 
Goode was clearly seeking to raise wider awareness of the issue through substantial pieces in The 
Times and elsewhere. This fits within the ‘opinion leader’ bracket. We suspect that the types of 
clauses that could be drafted to assimilate the Romalpa decision into commercial practice formed 
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a substantial part of this practice.130 Secondly, as a consultant to Mishcon, and creator of the 
specialist Centre for Commercial Law Studies, he was actively involved in communicating 
significant legal change to London’s commercial law firms. He is therefore acting as the personal 
conduit for change to be recognised and adaptations to be suggested. This brings him within the 
‘maven’ class, as a trusted guide to a fluid situation, where many possible courses of action could 
have been pursued. 
E. Conclusions, and Unresolved Questions 
We suspect that the combined effect of the Romalpa litigation and other notable insolvencies 
were communicated by key figures in the commercial law world and that sparked the hunt for an 
improved technology for the (non-)passing of title. Banks lending to purchasers of goods could no 
longer confidently look to that company’s store house or current account for security. Rather than 
spend resources verifying the status of each purchase, it is likely that this shock led to a position of 
equilibrium after a period of uncertainty. The fit between this theory, the contemporaneous 
accounts of rapid change post-Romalpa and the empirical evidence in the sovereign debt market 
seems to go beyond mere coincidence. In an ideal world we would have empirical evidence to 
bolster these claims. Without them, our conjecture is best used as a basis for further research 
projects where contract variation could be measured empirically. 
We add to the Scott / Gulati conjecture the role of mavens in spreading the innovations across a 
diffuse market. Here, we see leading commercial law academics as vital. Whilst their doctrinal 
analysis might have been limited (there appears in some places to be a wilful disregarding of 
Wheeler’s findings) it seems nonetheless to have been instrumental in legal change, at least in the 
boilerplate of sales contracts. 
There will be those who will say that the Scott / Gulati model was too obvious to be tested. This 
does not discourage us. It does not seem to have been written up, or considered as subject to 
proof, before. We view it as a significant development in the understanding of contractual 
variation and adaptation. TH Huxley when told of Darwin’s views on natural selection famously 
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remarked: ‘How extremely stupid not to have thought of that!’131 We trust that others will share 
our view, in time, too. 
 
[10260] 
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